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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Kevin K. Washburn*

The past year has been an active one for practitioners of environmental and
natural resources law involving Indian tribes. The following discussion does

not constitute a complete summary of the cases that have occurred in these
areas, but it does reflect some of the more interesting developments that have

occurred in the Indian and environmental law arena.
L Environmental Law

Congress and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
have become more aggressive in recognizing tribal governments as the entities
primarily responsible for regulating the environment within Indian reservations.
A new jurisdictional battleground has emerged around issues involving
environmental law. The opposing actors include the Indian tribes on one side,
with the state and local governments, and nonmembers who reside on

reservations, on the other.'
A tribe's ability to regulate environmental matters border-to-border within
Indian reservations is limited by the tribe's authority over nonmembers residing
or owning property within the reservation. The standard set out in the Supreme
Court's decision in Montana v. United Statesi measures a tribe's authority over

nonmembers. In that case, the Court indicated that a "ft]ribe may ... retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on
fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare

of the tribe."3 Based on the congressional intent underlying the environmental

*Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Indian Resources Section, Environment &
Natural Resources Division. Member, Chickasaw Nation. J.D., 1993, Yale Law School; B.A.,
1989, University of Oklahoma. The opinions expressed herein are entirely those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Justice. Before joining the
Department of Justice, the author clerked for Judge William C. Canby, Jr. of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The author also served as Editor-in-Chief of the Yale Journal on
Regulation.
1. While tribes clearly retain jurisdiction in certain broad areas, such as taxation, Merrion
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 151 (1982) (holding that tribes have inherent power to
tax nonmembers who conduct business on tribal lands and who benefit from governmental
services provided by the tribes); Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1386 (10th Cir.
1996) (allowing tribe to impose severance tax on oil and gas production on allotted Indian lands),
tribes have lost jurisdiction in other areas, including, for example, criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers, see Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Tribal environmental
programs generally fall within an area described as "civil regulatory" jurisdiction.
2. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
3. Id. at 566.
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address, the EPA and tribes have maintained that tribes can easily meet the

Montana test for purposes of regulating pollution activities because those
4
activities generally constitute a serious threat to tribal health and welfare.
Both the EPA and Congress have sought to increase the tribal role in

regulating the reservation environment. Congress has done so by explicitly
authorizing the EPA to treat Indian tribes as states, that is by delegating to
tribes the administration of environmental programs on Indian reservations.
Moreover, the EPA has sought to increase the tribal role even where federal
statutes fail to explain how the EPA should treat Indian reservations. States

and nonnembers have vigorously challenged the EPA's action in recognizing
tribal environmental regulation within both contexts.
A. The Treatment by the EPA of Indian Tribes in the Same Manner as
States Pursuantto CongressionalEnactment
In 1987, Congress amended the Clean Water Act to include a treatment-asa-state (TAS) provision that explicitly allows tribes to administer certain

programs under that Act Congress has also added TAS provisions to several
other environmental statutes.6 The existence of congressional authorization,
however, has not insulated the EPA from litigation involving approval of tribal
programs.
In Montana v. EPA,7 the State of Montana and others brought an action
challenging the EPA's decision to approve a TAS application submitted by the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation in
Montana The State asserted that the EPA could not treat the Tribes as a state

4. Th Clean Water Act is but one example. The Act's primary purpose is "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nations's waters." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a) (1994). The Act mandates minimum water quality standards throughout the country.
The standards are established by taking into consideration the use and value of water resources
for "public watersupplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural,
industrial, and other purposes." Id § 1313(c)(2)(A). In light of the fact that the Act seeks to
insure that water remains clean enough to meet the needs of public water supplies, Congress
clearly designed the Act to protect health and welfare.
5. Congress authorized the EPA to treat an Indian tribe in the same manner as a state for
certain purposes, including the development of water quality standards under section 303, and
certification of compliance with those standards under section 401. See Clean Water Act § 518(e),
33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994).
6. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(0(1) (1994); Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2706(a) (1994); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(1) (1994).
7. No. 96-35508 (9th Cir. filed Apr. 16, 1996).
8. Several similar actions are pending in the State of Wisconsin. In January 1996, Wisconsin
filed an action challenging the EPA's approval of a TAS application by the Sokoagan Community
Mole Lake Band of Chippewa Indians. Citing the fact that Wisconsin was admitted as a state 90
years before that tribe's reservation was established, Wisconsin argues that the tribe lacks
jurisdiction over the water resources on the reservation because of the equal footing doctrine. The
EPA has also approved, and Wisconsin has challenged, TAS programs for the Menominee, the
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because the Tribes lack jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians owning
lands in fee simple within the Reservation. The EPA countered that the Tribes
had demonstrated adequate jurisdiction because the activities of non-Indians on
fee lands had potentially severe negative potential impacts on tribal health and
welfare and, thus, the Tribes met the standard for jurisdiction enunciated in
Montana v. United States. Based on the voluminous evidence in the
administrative record demonstrating such impacts and in deference to the EPA's
role as the country's expert in assessing the affects of water pollution on human
health, the district court agreed with the EPA and upheld the EPA's decision.'
The State appealed, placing this case of first impression before the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In its brief on appeal, the State argued
that the Montana v. United States test no longer represented the applicable
standard to determine whether a tribe has jurisdiction over non-Indians. It has
asserted that the test was modified by the Supreme Court's later decision in
0
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation"
in
which Justice White implied that tribal jurisdiction was precluded if adequate
federal or state standards already applied to the activity in question. Citing later
cases that failed to indicate any change in the Montana v. United States
standard, the EPA responded that Brendale lacked a controlling majority
rationale and that the State has misinterpreted the opinion of Justice White and
the other splintered plurality opinions. The parties are awaiting a decision on
appeal.
Though Montana v. EPA involves the first direct challenge to a decision by
the EPA to treat an Indian tribe in the same manner as a state under the Clean
Water Act, it is not the first case to arise under the Clean Water Act TAS
regime. In City of Albuquerque v. Browner," Albuquerque challenged the
EPA's decision to approve a tribe's water quality standards which were more
strict than existing federal standards. After obtaining TAS approval, which
was not challenged, the Pueblo of Isleta set water quality standards sufficient
to protect the Pueblo's cultural uses of water. When the EPA approved the
standards and began the process of revising Albuquerque's National Pollution
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit to comply with the downstream
standards, Albuquerque sued the EPA in federal district court. Among other
arguments raised, Albuquerque asserted that the Pueblo lacked authority to set
standards more stringent than those required by the Clean Water Act and that,
even if it could, such standards would not apply to upstream, off-reservation
polluters. Albuquerque also argued that the standards violated the

Lac du Flambeau, and the Oneida tribes. These cases are also pending in federal district courts

in Wisconsin.
9. Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945 (D.Mont. 1996).
10. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
11. 97 F.3d 415 (1996).
12. Albuquerque did not challenge the EPA's decision to treat the Pueblo as a state.
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Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because the purpose of the
Pueblos's stringent standards was to protect religious uses.
The district court ruled against Albuquerque,' 3 and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed." The Tenth Circuit rejected Albuquerque's argument that the Pueblo
cannot set standards more stringent than the existing federal standards. It noted
that the Clean Water Act prohibits the Pueblo from setting standards below the
federal standards and, thus, if the court adopted Albuquerque's argument, the
Pueblo could only set standards that were identical to the federal standards.
Such a reading would essentially render the TAS scheme nugatory. The court
concluded that the Clean Water Act did not limit inherent tribal sovereignty to
set more stringent standards and, thus, the court held that the EPA reasonably
approved the standards."S The court likewise rejected Albuquerque's argument
that the Pueblo's water quality standards could not be applied to upstream
polluters. The Clean Water Act clearly gave the EPA the power to respect the
water quality standard of a downstream state or tribe in issuing NPDES
permits." Finally, the Tenth Circuit rejected the establishment clause
argument, ruling that the "EPA's purpose in approving the designated use is
unrelated to the Isleta Pueblo's religious reasons for establishing it."' 7
While the Tenth Circuit's decision in City of Albuquerque v. Browner and
the district court decision in Montana v. EPA constitute significant victories for
tribes and the EPA, congressional developments- may overtake judicial
decisions in this area. In the 104th Congress, the House passed an amendment
to the Clean Water Act that would limit the ability of tribes to exercise
regulatory authority over Indian reservations by restricting their role under TAS
provisions to trust lands. 8 In light of the checkerboard pattern of property
ownership on many reservations, such legislation might have resulted in
regulatory regimes on reservations that are difficult to administer and
impossible to enforce. Although the legislation did not pass the Senate, such
amendments may arise again in the future.
B. The Treatment by the EPA of Indian Tribes in the Same Manner as
States in the Absence of ClearAuthorization by Congress
In Backcountry Against Dumps v. EPA, 9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Chcuit struck down the EPA's approval of a municipal solid waste
program submitted by the Campo Band of Mission Indians in Southern
California under Subtitle D of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993).
City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (1996).
A- at 423.
A1
Ia at 428.
This legislation might have mooted Montana v. EPA.
100 F.3d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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(RCRA).' The EPA reviewed and approved the Campo Band's program even
though RCRA lacks a "treatment-as-a-state" provision.2
Indeed, though Subtitle D seeks to preserve local control of solid waste, it
contains no explicit provision as to how Indian tribes should be treated under
the Act.' In light of the congressional preference in RCRA-D for local
regulatory control, and because states generally lack authority to apply their
programs on Indian reservations, the EPA determined that tribes may submit,
and the EPA may review, tribal solid waste programs.
Under an approved program, a state or tribe obtains primary authority for
overseeing the operation of individual landfills. Moreover, a state or tribe with
an approved program may develop criteria for compliance with federal
standards that differ from the general federal criteria.' The local regulatory
scheme is designed to provide a regulating entity with more flexibility in
meeting the purposes of safe waste disposal than the general nationwide
provisions allow. Thus, the EPA's approval of the Campo Band's program
allowed the Band to offer more flexible, location-specific requirements that are
more attractive to an owner or operator than the general nationwide standards.
The plaintiffs in the Backcountry case were non-Indians who lived just
outside the reservation boundaries. They argued that Congress had not given
the EPA authority to approve tribal solid waste programs and that federal
agencies possess only that authority which Congress affirmatively provides.
Since Congress never enacted a treatment-as-states provision in RCRA, the
plaintiffs argued that the EPA lacked authority to treat a tribe in the same
manner as a state.
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs. The court rejected the EPA's
argument that its statutory interpretation was reasonable and consistent with the
congressional intent in providing for local control of waste disposal. It also
rejected the EPA's argument that denial of otherwise adequate tribal programs

20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949(a) (1994) [hereinafter RCRA or RCRA-D]. RCRA sets forth
the national policy for regulation of non-hazardous solid waste. In enacting the RCRA-D scheme,
Congress sought to preserve local control of solid waste and small quantities of hazardous waste.
Therefore, it created a scheme in which state and local governments have primary authority.
Under Subtitle C of RCRA, on the other hand, which governs most hazardous waste, Congress
directed that the EPA would have primary authority. Id. § 6925.
21. For a detailed discussion of the Campo Band's environmental regime, see Kevin Gover
& Jana L. Walker, Commercial Solid and Hazardous Waste Disposal Projects on Indian Lands,
10 YALE J. ON REG. 229, 250-59 (1993).
22. Besides RCRA, other environmental statutes also lack TAS provisions, including the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide & Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994) [hereinafter
FIFRA] and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994) [hereinafter
TSCA]. One explanation for failure of Congress to include a TAS provision in RCRA is that,
unlike the federal statutes which have TAS provisions, RCRA has not been comprehensively
revisited by Congress since it was enacted. Congress apparently did not begin to consider the
unique issues involving regulatory authority on federal Indian reservations until 1987.
23. The revised criteria for approved programs are set out in 40 C.F.R. § 258 (1994).
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would create a gap, that is, owner-operators that chose to locate municipal
waste disposal projects in Indian country would be unable to obtain the flexible
requirements available under an approved state program.
The court ruled that this was not a "gap," but a recognition that RCRA
treats Indian tribes differently than states, stating "[a]Ithough treating tribes
differently from states may be unfair as a policy matter, and may be the result
of Congressional inadvertence, the remedy lies with Congress, not with EPA
or the courts."' With that statement, the court made it clear that, in the
absence of a "treatment-as-a-state" provision, the EPA is not entirely free to
validate tribal programs. This ruling makes it more difficult for the EPA to
eradicate the inequities created by the jurisdictional checkerboard that exists in
Indian country.
I. Taxation of NaturalResources
Tribes scored significant victories last year involving both state and tribal
taxation of natural resources. In Crow Tribe v. Montana,' for example, the
Ninth Circuit ordered a lower court to enter a $55 million judgment in favor
of the Crow Tribe as restitution against the State of Montana and Big Horn
County for severance and gross proceed taxes improperly collected from coal
mining on the Crow Reservation. The court also ordered the lower court to
consider the Tribe's claim for prejudgment interest.'
The Crow Tribe opinion is noteworthy primarily because it reversed a
district court under the deferential "abuse of discretion" standard for failing to
grant equitable relief to the Tribe, which had demonstrated in earlier cases the
merits of its claim.' In a previous opinion, the Ninth Circuit made it
abundantly clear that the taxes were unlawful.
The district court paid the Crow Tribe $23 million in severance taxes that
the lessee had paid into the court's registry following the Tribe's successful
assertion of its right to bring a claim.' This most recent case established that
the Tribe can recover restitution for monies that the State and County had
collected under the unlawful tax prior to the order that all such taxes be paid
into the court's registry. This decision sets firm precedent that states will not
be allowed to keep from Indian tribes the proceeds of taxes collected
unlawfully.

24. Backcountry, 100 F.3d at 152.

25. 92 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
26. Id. at 830.
27. Id. Crow Tribe represented the fourth time that the case had been before the Ninth
Circuit. The first two cases established law on the state's authority to impose taxes on tribal
natural resources. See, e.g., Crow Tribe v. Montana, 665 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1982) (Crow 1);
Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), affd without opinion, 484 U.S. 997 (1988)
(Crow I).
28. Crow II, 484 U.S. at 903.
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Another significant victory for tribes occurred in Mustang ProductionCo.
v. Harrison in which the Tenth Circuit ruled that a tribe may impose
severance taxes on oil and gas removed from allotted lands held in trust by
individual tribal members. While it previously was settled that a tribe could
impose taxes on tribal lands, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a tribe may tax any
allotted trust lands within "Indian country" as that term is defined in the Major
Crimes Act.' In light of the breadth of the definition, the Tenth Circuit's
decision confirms broad taxing authority for tribes.
III. Water Rights Cases
In the McCarran Amendment,"' Congress waived sovereign immunity in
state courts for the adjudication of federal water rights. Under that provision,
many western states have taken jurisdiction over the determination of federal
Indian reserved water rights in adjudications undertaken to determine all water
rights in a given river. Accordingly, unlike most other areas of Indian law in
which litigation occurs primarily in federal or tribal courts, many of the most
important developments in water rights lav occur in state courts. Within the
past year, tribes have obtained two significant victories in state courts in water
rights cases.
In Montana, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes successfully
blocked the state from granting new water rights permits within the boundaries
of the Flathead Indian Reservation in In re Beneficial Water Use Permit Nos.
66459-76L (the Pope case).32 The Pope case began when the Flathead Tribes
objected to the State's decision to grant two new applications for water use
permits and an application for a change of use for an existing permit.
According to statutory water law in Montana, the Montana Department of
Natural Resources and Conservation may issue a new water use permit only
if, first, the applicant can prove that there are unappropriated waters; second,
the water rights of a prior appropriator will not be adversely affected by the
grant of the new permit; and, third, the new permit will not interfere with the
use of existing rights or permits.33
Because the Flathead Tribes' water rights indisputably are senior to any new
appropriators on the Reservation and because their rights have not yet been
quantified in Montana's general stream adjudication, the Tribes argued that it
was practically and theoretically impossible for an applicant to meet its burden
of proof under any of the three elements set forth in the statute.' The

29. 94 F.3d 1382 (10th Cir. 1996).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (1994).
31. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
32. 923 P.2d 1073 (Mont. 1996).
33. Montana Water Use Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(1) (1995); see also Pope, 923

P.2d at 1076.
34. Pope, 923 P.2d at 1077.
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Montana Supreme Court agreed?' It ruled that an applicant could not meet
the statutory burden until the Tribes' rights are quantified in a water compact
or under a decree entered in a general stream adjudication.'
Likewise, in Arizona, Indian tribes were successful in preventing the State
from harming the tribes' interests in federal reserved water rights. Following
the Arizona state legislature's enactment of comprehensive amendments in
1995, tie San Carlos, Tonto, Yavapai and Camp Verde Apache tribes in
Arizona filed a petition for a special action in the Arizona Supreme Court. A
year-long battle over the constitutionality of numerous comprehensive
amendments to the Arizona Water Code concluded with a victory for the
Indian tribes that opposed the changes in In re Apache Tribes' Special.
Action.3
In the petition, the tribes asked the Supreme Cdurt to accept original
jurisdiction to hear the tribes' challenges to the amendments to the Arizona
Water Code." The Arizona Supreme Court granted the Apache Tribes'
petition and ordered the special action to proceed before a trial court judge.
Before that judge, the Apache Tribes argued that the comprehensive changes
to Arizona's general stream adjudication scheme were unconstitutional and
placed the state court adjudication outside of the limited waiver of sovereign
immunity set forth in the McCarran Amendment, thus effectively withdrawing
the state courts' jurisdiction over federal Indian reserved water rights.
The Apache Tribes' arguments were based on numerous provisions in the
comprehensive amendments. Boldly, the amendments explicitly applied to, and
thereby attempted to modify, water rights that had long since been perfected."
The Apache Tribes argued that the legislature could not retroactively change
existing property rights.
In addition, the amendments sought to exclude from the Arizona general
stream adjudication certain "de minimis" categories. Under the de minimis
provisions, certain small water uses would be excluded from the adjudication.
Under the new provision, however, the legislature sought to exclude small
claims which, in the aggregate, encompassed between two-thirds and four-fifths

35. I. at 1080.

36. Id
37. In re Special Action Proceedings Initiated by the Apache Tribes, No. CY-95-0161-SA
(Ariz. Superior Ct. Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter Special Action Proceedings].

38. The Apache Tribes have also made arguments similar to those by the Flathead Tribes
in Pope. 'hey have sought to halt new water rights claims in Arizona by asking the Arizona
courts to declare the Gila River Basin "fully appropriated" and, thus, to forbid new water rights
claims from being made on that water source. Action on that motion has been stayed pending
the Arizona Supreme Court's decision on whether to adopt the Superior Court findings or declare
them unconstitutional.
39. H.R.J. Res. 2276, 42d Leg., 1st Sess., 1995 Arizona Laws 36 (codified at 45 ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANn. §§ 141-272 (Supp. 1996)).
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of all the claims in the adjudication. ' Much more conservative standards for
so-called de minimis uses had already been determined by the courts after
extensive litigation in the general stream adjudication, leading the Apache
Tribes to argue that the state was attempting legislatively to overturn each
victory they had obtained in the state courts. Indeed, the legislature departed
significantly from the water use levels that the courts found to be de minimis
and therefore subject to exclusion from the adjudication.
The statute contained numerous other provisions, many of which the Apache
Tribes challenged. Since its inception, Arizona's water rights scheme has
incorporated concepts of prior appropriation and beneficial use. Under these
principles, if water is not put to beneficial use, the water right claimed is
deemed abandoned. A determination of abandonment benefits every user junior
to the abandoned water right. One amendment sought to create several
exceptions to the abandonment rule, listing numerous circumstances in which
nonuse of a water right would not cause abandonment.
After analyzing the comprehensive changes, the court found many of the
amendments ineffective because they purportedly applied to existing perfected
water rights.4' It found that the amendments could not retroactively change
perfected water rights. As to the de minimis categories set out in the
legislation, the court found that the legislative determinations of what
constituted a de minimis use violated the doctrine of separation of powers
because the courts had already carefully considered and determined what
4
Moreover, because the de
amount of water use constituted de minimis!
minimis provisions constituted a legislative, rather than a judicial declaration
of water rights, the court ruled that the provisions, if given effect, would take
away the "judicial" nature of the action and take the Arizona general stream
adjudications outside the waiver of sovereign immunity set out in the McCarran
Amendment 43 which enables state courts to adjudicate federal water rights."
Finally, the court ruled ineffective the legislature's attempt to enact a retroactive
change in the law of abandonment, ruling that anyone who sought to invoke
one of the exceptions to abandonment named by the legislature must prove that
the exception merely codified existing law.4' The parties are now awaiting the
Arizona Supreme Court's acceptance, reversal, or modification of the trial court
judge's opinion on the special action issue.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

45 ARIz. REv. STAT. § 258 (repealed 1980).
Special Action Proceedings, supra note 37, slip op. at 9-15.
Id. at 18.
43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
Special Action Proceedings, supra note 37, slip op. at 43-45.
Id. at 23-26.
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